Blocks 51-61-71 or The provincial courthouse of Vancouver: a short history part 1

Blocks 51-61 and 71 are the ones sitting between Howe and Hornby, and between Georgia and Nelson, numbered from North to South

the early XX centuries

The first courthouse built in Vancouver in 1888, and will be demolished in 1912. It will become Victory square in 1924.

At the turn of the century the court house was located on what is now Victory square. It will be relocated on Georgia in 1912 in the building designed by Francis Mawson Rattenbury. (nowadays house of the VAG). The annex facing Robson will be added in the 30s.[7]

In those days, the building main entrance face a ceremonial square onto Georgia street [1]:

The Vancouver court house circa 1912

.

While the South side seems to use to be a lawn:

The South side of the Vancouver courthouse seems to use to be a lawn

The 50′s

City of Vancouver was eyeing the Block 61 (South of the today VAG), to transform the whole area in a civic center, by relocating noticeably the public library and the BC electric building.

• An Auditorium is considered for block 61 in 1949
• After an exhaustive study to select a location for a public space in 1958, block 61 is selected in 1960.

Most of the block 61 is acquired-thru expropriation- by the city by early 1964. At this time Downtown Vancouver is a sea of parking lot:

Aerial view of block 61 and surrounding circa 1964 – credit (2)

The 60′s

The Province had expansion plan for its court house since 1955. The original 1955 plan to add a building on Robson having encountered firm opposition, the Province had acquired the land behind Hotel Vancouver and some parcels on block 61… But in 1963 it was considered critical to add a parking structure to the Hotel Vancouver. a deal was stroke:

• The Province sold its land north of Hotel Vancouver to the Hotel, for purpose of building a parkade
• The City sold block 61 to the province, for the court house expansion and other governmental uses, understanding it will also include a civic square

The sale occurred in 1964, and land ownership was then as illustrated below, with Eaton owning block 52 and 71:

Land ownership in 1964 of blocks 51, 61 and surrounding

In 64, the block 51-61 was envisioned as below by the Vancouver city planning department:

1964: City intention for blocks 51-61 according to (4)

The Province was seeing the things slightly differently, with the adding of building on block 51, and some commercial developments:

The Province intention for block 51 and 61 not revealed before April 65 according to (4)

Retail corridors like Hasting were already seriously declining and the city was not seeing commercial development on block 61 as desirable. The city strongly opposed to the Province proposal for this reason.

…At least, it is the story telling of the city brief [4] to be presented in 1965 to the Premier W.A.C Bennett:

The 1964 Redevelopment plan

The redevelopment plans published by the city in 1964 [2] were already integrating an additional building on block 51

Block 51, 61 and surrounding as envisioned by a 1964 city report

The design then considered by the city didn’t seem to consider a major public square. The development of pedestrian precinct, fully segregated from motorist traffic, was considered along the lines below:

Vancouver 1964: considered Pedestrian precinct fully segregated of motor traffic

That said, the city will have the Vancouver art council to commission Arthur Erickson Geoffrey Massey and Bruno Freschi to offer a counter proposal for which we have a specific post:

the 1966 Erickson/Massey proposal

Robson square and the provincial court as originally envisioned by Erickson in its 1966 proposal

Needless to say the Province was decided to move on with its plan leaving the square question open:

1966-1972 : Where is the square?

The Province design was not considered offering an attractive enough space for a civic square. The city approached the Province to buy back block 61 without success. so the city resolved to consider [8]

• block 71 as a civic square., a then considered very poor alternative.
• block 42 because it was owned by the city (purchased with the proceed of the block 61 sale).
• a one block in the area bounded by Hasting, Seymour, Georgia and Hamilton street
• have scattered open space in the city

And a last alternative, echoing the Erickson 66 proposal:

• Acquisition of block 51 for a civic space

In the meantime, the city acquired block 71 from Eaton, since the site was considered as suitable for a ‘central’ park, if not a civic square, and could be used to trade with other properties, again echoing the erickson 66 proposal.

The Province, on its side, was busy moving on the new court house:

The Plan in early 1972

The year 1972 starts with the following design, from aprioiri Thompson, Berwick, Pratt and Partners, poised to be built:

the court house at block 51-61

The proposed high-rise, beyond its height, 698feet accomodating 55 storeys, was a 200 feet wide slab tower along Smythe, twice bigger than the Electra building (by the same architect). It was obviously against any by-law; the Province is not legally bind by city by-law; but this was not the major contentious point with the city administration. The proposal have its fair share of oddities:

• Block 51 and 61 was needed to be zoned commercial
• No sidewalk was planned on the south side of Robson
• A 14 feet passageway between the old court house and a new building was planned, to connect it to a 25 feet wide interior court yard
• The proposal was assuming that the block 71 should be a park, providing an open setting to the tower

While the city engineering department was considering the provided parking space (630), as noticeably insufficient (they were asking for 1200), the civic design panel had considered that “the tower structure itself, is well designed and in an acceptable location” but that the “most important problem is considered the lack of open space separation between the proposed new building and the [old] court house”[6].

…Needless to say the resident had a very different opinion on the slab-tower.

August 30, 1972

The W.A.C bennett government is defeated by the NDP, in the Provincial election: The project is stopped, but it is not the end of the story, to be continued here

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all source from [4] unless otherwise noticed

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[1] More informal gathering space was at Larwill park, at Georgia and Beatty.

[2] Redevelopment in downtown Vancouver : report No 5, City of Vancouver, 1964.

[4] Block 51 and 61, D.L. 541 City Planning Department, Vancouver BC, June 1965

[6] Memo to Vancouver City council- “BC Centre and court House additions Block 51 and 61″, May 31, 1972

[7] date from [4], Notice that there is a discrepancy with what say Wikipedia

[8] Memo to Vancouver City Council- “A civic square for DownTown Vancouver”, September 22, 1969

Vancouver 1966: The Erickson/Massey proposal for block 61 and the Downtown core

in the 1960′s the Province and the city of Vancouver were in thorny discussions regarding the development of critical downtown blocks known as block 51 (where the Vancouver Art Gallery sits) and the block 61 on its immediate southern edge. The city, unhappy with the direction imposed by the Province, had the Vancouver art Council to commission Arthur Erickson and Geoffrey Massey, to develop a counter-proposal [1], what they will do in 1966:

Robson square and the provincial court as originally envisioned by Erickson/Massey in their 1966 proposal

The Erickson/Massey proposal was redefining an area much larger than block 51 and 61. It was including also block 71 and 42, among other:

The Massey/Erickson’s proposal for block 61 and the downtown core

One will eventually draw some parallels with the Le Corbusier‘s plan Voisin for Paris. While the cold reception of his plan had contributed to make Le Corbusier person non grata in Paris…Vancouver gave a much warmer reception to the Erickson modernist ideas! [2]

In detail, this plan, extend the government activities on block 71, reserving the block 51 to civic activities. Erickson was considering that:

“If the downtown is to survive as a shopping center street, it must compete on equal term with the suburban shopping center, it must provides adjacent parking, free pedestrian traffic flow without crossing traffic lanes and some degree of shelter and pleasant surrounding for the shopper.”

Accordingly, the traffic movement was addressed in a multi-layered system, in which car and pedestrian were atop, while bus and truck, considered as service, were put underground:

1966 Erickson/Massey proposal: traffic organization, notice that most of car traffic crossing is done using under/over pass, like suggested for the Burrard/Georgia intersection

His rationals for the segregation of traffic per mode -also promoted by Le Corbusier then for different reasons- lead him to design Robson street and Granville street, the identified main retail Malls (by Erickson, as by the city), on at least 3 levels:

1966 Erickson/Massey proposal: Granville Mall is multi level, transit at lower level, pedestrian-called “shopper”, above

• atop, a covered pedestrian mall on one to 2 levels
• below, a bus tunnel, where the bus, in the Erickson view, are understood as parking shuttle
• and at lower level, a service lane for truck traffic

Robson
A case of more interest to us in the context of the current city plan

1966 Erickson/Massey proposal: Section along Robson street, showing the transit tunnel, the truck tunnel, and 2 level of covered shopping level above.

The Strasse becomes a Shopping arcade

The Robson Strasse, transformed into a shopping arcade. there is some opening -for light and ventilation- allowing you to see the buses at lower level

The access to Robson square is done thru the second level of the Shopping arcade – to not impede car traffic on Hornby street.

The Square

1966 Erickson/Massey proposal: Georgia cross Burrard thru an overpass. Robson square is connected to Robson street on the West via a passerelle…on the East the connection is unclear. It seems the pedestrian is expected to go/from Eatons and pacific shopping centre.

How to get there?

Of course, all that had to be serviced by an appropriate network of freeway, and Erickson was also calling for a ring road:

A ring road was proposed to connect all of the then envisioned extensive freeway network including , Brockton, a third crossing of the Burrard inlet

Some comments

Eventually there is a rational to believe that Erickson was better architect than urbanist, thought some will probably explain that the Erickson mastery is not enough understood:

The general development form, with strict separation of movement according to transportation mode, implicitly negating the social function of the street, was a staple of the time, and is usually concomitant to a general organization of the space on multi-level. Such schemes have almost universally proven to be a failure

That said this proposal is important, because it lays down many concept which will be applied in the design of the existing provincial court house complex. One of the most important is not to consider an extension of the Provincial court (from block 51 to block 61), but a relocation of it ( from block 51 to blocks 61/71), freeing block 51 to civic usage. The concept of the sunken plaza, is also introduced in this proposal.

Some other concepts will appear in a different form in the Vancouver urban landscape…like the covered mall of the proposal, which will later translates into the rain-screen above sidewalk- in fact more inline with what was envisioned by Eugène Hénard in its vision of the Parisian street of the future…in 1900.

The street of the future, as seen by Eugène Hénard, shares significant commonalities with the Erickson vision. The main difference being that Henard keeps the transit and all human activities on the surface. he eventually didn’t fathom the space required by the automobile

It also states some important analysis:

• bring the people as close as they want to go

While the car was considered as the mean of choice. Tansit was considered as an important complementary component to the accessibility, and was brought right into the high street of the town, including of course Robson street and square.

Analysis/critics and concern expressed on the Eatons centre; can also be considered as prescient for the time:

“Cemp-Eaton development could very well help the surrounding commercial areas instead of showing a blank face to them. We see the Cemp_eaton project as a vital catalyst to the downtown but are anxious that it not to be inward-looking and self-cenetred, threathening the existing shopping of Granville Street by creating its own subtarrean shopping centre, divorced from the existing shopping pattern.”

As well, a good analysis of why the downtown Vancouver didn’t follow the path of other downtown in North America:

“The downtown Vancouver has strong characteristics, principally from the uniqueness of its site, the surrounding sea, the beaches, the harbour, Stanley Park, and the crossing to the mountains.Largely because of this, the West End has emerged as one of the unique residential precincts in the world”

Cities downtown will eventually learn later, that to be thriving, they don’t have to compete on equal term with the suburban shopping center, but have to offer what they can do the best: a “real” urban experience in all its complexities… which supposes a certain level of “entropy” in its spatial organization

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source: A Proposal for Block 61 and the Downtown Core. Erickson/Massey architects, Vancouver, 1966

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[1] Bruno Freschi was also part of the team (source, VancouverSun, May 18 1966) thought his name didn’t appear on the author list of the proposal

[2] It was of course some dissident voices. The more noticeable was the one of the jurists, and the attorney general of the time, Robert Bonner. They had commissioned the architect Vladimir Plavsic to draft a “counter-counter proposal” (I don’t have more information on it, but for the record, Plavsic was a “brutalist” architect: he has designed the 805 Broadway Medical Dental Centre known as the Frank Stanzl building).

Building a streetcar mythology

Or how some streetcar advocates make their case by using the Iraq war’s lobbyists strategy.

Such strategy is not to be embarrassed with facts, but to express an opinion legitimated by an ample corpus of previously expressed opinions, which are presented as facts. It becomes then a mythology, because it is asked to people to believe unquestionably in them. and if it succeed at it, the unsubstantiated “facts” become “truisms”!

The streetcar example with a report : Streetcar Land Use Study

It is a report commissioned and published by the Planning department of the District of Columbia- so must be serious (We refer to it as “the report”)- which explains that a Washington D.C. streetcar network could generate $15Billion of investment along its corridors.

How it arrives to such a conclusion?

Basically it is grounded on a Portland streetcar company‘s paper [9], analyzing the real estate development in the years 1997-2008, which eventually happens to coincide with a global real estate boom, and general gentrification of cities’ downtown across the continent.

In addition of the global factors above, it has been also some more local factor attracting development in Portland:

• A green belt constraining the development area
• Other transit development (3 max line, an aerial tram…), all converging in downtown
• Insitutional development [1]
• Tax credit [1]
• A street car loop

What is the exact contribution of the streetcar loop among the above cited parameters? It is not deciphered by the Washington D.C. study, apparently considering that the entirety of the developments occurring in the 2 blocks of the streetcar are triggered by virtue of its track presence.

No streetcar related redevelopment example: left, The San Fernando Building in LA, A successful revitalization effort in Down-town Los Angeles by developer Tom Gilmore- photo credit (3)-right the Woodward building neighborhood in Vancouver

What are the inherent quality of the streetcar provoking that?

The report describes it as a “Premium transit” transit service that is “reliable, predictable, and offers a high-quality ride—in other words, Metrorail [Note: the DC subway] or the streetcar“.

What about speed and frequency? does it really doesn’t matter? …and in what aspect a streetcar operating in mixed traffic can be more reliable-or predictable- than a bus?

A streetcar operating in mixed traffic is subject to the same reliability issue faced by a bus...with even less ability to avoid road impediment- credit photo (4)

What are the involved cost of the streetcar?

The venture of the report in this area is rich of learning. It states that: “Evidence [...] suggests that streetcar vehicles offer better long-term cost-benefit value than buses”. Where are the evidence? 2 references are cited:

• Street Smart: Streetcars and Cities in the Twenty-First Century – Gloria Ohland & Shelley Poticha; 2009
• Seven Rules for Sustainable Communities from Patrick Condon [5]

It is worth to mention, that, first the conclusions of Patrick Condon are grounded on the finding of the other referenced book, and secondly, [5] presents numbers which should be subject to caution [6].

Circular referencing, but no cross checking…That was also the strategy of the Iraq war lobbyist

In anyway, a blanket statement like “streetcar vehicles offer better long-term cost-benefit value than buses” is discounting too many parameters to be taking seriously: one of them is that the long-term cost-benefit of a vehicle is tied to its productivity, which depend in part of the ridership.

What about other alternatives

The bus alternative is briefly investigated to be better dismissed: “Although well-designed BRT systems attract some development, their impacts are typically much less than those for rail”, this by citing [7] where one will have hard time to find which aspect of [7] leads the report to such a conclusion. In fact [7] suggests that “there is growing documentation of [BRT] positive development effects; however, given the newness of most BRT systems, more information is needed” while another [8] find that “the type and level of investment occurring near BRT stations appears comparable to the experience with TOD near rail transit”. Notice that this later reference provides relevant number:

“Since the Silver Line BRT was introduced, there has been over $571 million in investment along this corridor, and the tax base grew by 247%, compared to a city average of 146%. “

Relative growth on tax base in the corridor versus average… The Kind of information the streetcar report fails to provide.

And, outside transportation… does there is no other cost-effective avenue to shape development? Institutional impetuous as seeing in Surrey BC, seems to produce good effect, other large scale development like the Woodward building in Vancouver also…

Mythology building

Like in any mythology, with the streetcar mythology, facts are second to beliefs. The Streetcar myth just needs a critical mass of believers. If enough developers and buyers believe in it, the prophecy will be self fulling…that is why all the produced literature referencing itself is paramount.

Vancouver’s believer will then ask the question as Gordon Price did: “why not at least a return of the heritage tram to Science World?“, but the question shouldn’t be framed like it, it should be

• “what you want to try to achieve by returning the heritage tram to Science World?”

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[1] Numerous of land lots, developed around the streetcar, are or were institutional, and a 10 years property tax waiver has been put in place to “faciliate” development in the streetcar corridor(source: [2])

[2] Debunking Portland The City That Doesn’t Work, Randal O’Toole, July 9, 2007

[3] Eric Richardon

[4] Jarret Walker

[5] Seven Rules for Sustainable Communities, Patrick M. Condon

[6] In term of operating/capital cost: Number provided by APTA and Translink could suggest a pretty different picture, from the one stated in [5], see for example this post.

[7]TCRP Report ıı8: Bus Rapid Transit Practitioner’s
Guide, 2007

[8]Bus Rapid Transit and Transit Oriented Development, Breakthrough Technologies Institute, Washington, 2008

[9]Portland Streetcar Development Oriented Transit, Office of Transportation and Portland Streetcar Inc.

Transportation Paradigm shift in Seoul

Last week, Dr. Kee Yeon Hwang, president of the Korea Transport Institute, was in town for two enlightening presentations [5].

the dismantling of a downtown freeway to restore the Cheonggye Stream,

SightLineDaily has a good report of this lecture [6]. As noticed in the report, Dr. Kee Yeon Hwang, has insisted on the historically cultural and spiritual (Feng shui) importance of the stream in the Seoul context.

Thought that the dismantling of the freeway was a campaign promise of the then mayoral candidate Lee Myung-bak, it is not clear how central this promise was in the campaign, since Dr. Kee Yeon Hwang himself admitted he was not expecting to see this promise fulfilled.

It is not clear too how much of the Seoul electorate was using the freeway versus the suburbanite not participating in the vote. In that instance, Seoulites heavily relying on public transit could have got a different opinion of its suburbanite neighbors, like did the Londoner or Stockholm people on congestion charge, or Parisian on the Delanoë program to close the freeway on the Seine river banks (at least during summer month) and introduce bike and bus lanes in the city.

Nevertheless, the point to retain, is that in Seoul; like in Paris with Delanoë or London with Livingstone;

• once invested in a mandate legitimated by recent election, civic leaders have to act fast to ensure that the their constituents are able to measure the positive effect of the controversial shift, that in the time of a mandate.

That is what has been achieved by the very controversial congestion charge in London, that s what has been achieved by the bus lanes and other initiatives from Delanoë in Paris, and that is what has been achieved by the restoration of the Cheonggye Stream in Seoul.

Cheonggye Stream before and after the restoration project: freeway has disappeared, and new space is enjoyed by people. credit photos (3)

Another important thing to retain and key to the success of the Cheonggye Stream restoration is that in Seoul, like in New York with pedestrianization of Time square, that has eased the congestion.

• the reduction of road space has not to be done at the expense of the mobility in the city

More, the freeway dismantling was part of a package on refocusing transportation on public transit, object of the second lecture presented at Surrey SFU.

The improving of Seoul’s bus service by reforming operating practice

you will find some materials similar to the one presented in [1] and [2].

Considering the Vancouver political context, you could have think sensible from the part of SFU to schedule this second lecture in Surrey, since South of the Fraser is well known for not lacking of full time whiner when come to talk of bus service in Surrey and other low density suburbs of the valley.

After waiting 30mn at this bus stop on Garden City at Richmond, if you believe this bus gonna be yours: you are heading for disappointment! Only one route among 3 servicing Garden city stop here. How to know which one? neither the bus stop, the bus livery or transit map will tell you...there is certainly room for improvement of bus service in Vancouver area too

If I have spotted Jonathan Cote, from New Westminster council, I have failed to see any of those SoF “full time” whiners, including their civic leaders in the very scarce attendance. They seems in fact to show little appetite at listening ideas on how to improve transit in their jurisdiction…may be because they follow a different agenda which is more driven by the promotion of a pet project than anything else.

However in this lecture, Dr. Kee Yeon Hwan has put himself more or less in the shoes of the typical SoF bus rider:

• Low bus frequency with pass-up at that
• Low reliability with lack of information
• slow and circuitous routes
• lack of readability of system
• no fare integration

In brief, the bus system was built to serve a “captive” market, with little regard for its patrons, and in numerous regard was falling behind the rest of the world standard in many aspect.

In the 80′s, Seoul has aggressively developed his subway network- it is one of the busiest in the world- eventually at the expense of its bus system… and global impact on the overall transit modeshare was tiny.

It was becoming clearly evident that an “all subway” policy -limited by funding- couldn’t be good enough to address the mobility needs of Seoul.

Numerous actions have been taken to change it, the first one being the governance of the public transit system. In that instance, the system was apparently one looking like a “leasehold” bus route offering little flexibility for adjustment in the public interest, and has been changed to one of public service concession of 3 years in length. Notice that the later model has became the modus operandi of most of the public transit agencies in Europe and Australia.

This change done, the route network has been rationalized according to the served market, trunk route, feeder route,… straight route preferred to circuitous route… beside it the main change could be considered as marketing ones

• bus route numbering representing origin destination
• bus colored according to the served market
• Real time information of patrons
• All buses running on CNG
• …

The list couldn’t have been complete without the introduction of the smart-card, which address the problem of fare integration (transfer). Some of the most visible change have already been discussed in Regarding Place.

It could be some case (right picture), where a more complex livery like the one adopted by the operator of route X5 in London northern suburbs, could provide more useful information to the not yet transit rider -the bus advise route, price, frequency (notice that the advised frequency is 30mn...) -than a simpler color code understood mainly by already transit rider (left picture)

Lot of expectation was carried with those changes, and aggressive targets was set. the conclusions of the exercise are more dim.

While the reform of the bus system has lead to a dramatically improved service on several metrics like bus speed or bus punctuality…in despite of a significant increase in ridership, it has failed to reach the very aggressive goal originally set in that aspect, and eventually has translated in concerns over the subsidiary level of the bus system which is greater than expected. A noticed problem is that the route concession is paid on a mileage bus service basis disregarding the ridership, hence providing no incentive for the bus operator to increase it.

But the main lesson is that an extensive subway network shouldered by a massive bus network will never replace the -at least perceived- convenience of car. and at some point you have also to take action to control the usage of it to avoid road congestion, and that is road pricing.

The idea seems to have been introduced in Seoul in the 90′s [4], but the currency crisis in 97 will have stopped the implementation of it (it is not clear why it has no been resumed later on). The Chair of the lecture, will conclude it by the very relevant question:

What level of public transit is good enough to reach before introducing congestion pricing?

The answer of the speaker will be not less interesting, and was understood like it:

If you listen the naysayers, it will never be good enough transit

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[1] Seoul Bus System Reform Project, D. Kim and S. Gaham, fall 2009

[2] Environmentally Sustainable
Transport Policies in Korea, S. Lee, 2009

[3] http://stlelsewhere.blogspot.com

[4] Four year old Namsan Tunnel Congestion Pricing scheme in Seoul: success or failure?. B. Son, and K. Y Hwang, Int Assoc Traffic Saf Sci journal, vol. 26, no 1, pp28-36, 2002

[5] You will aslo find an interview at the Translink’s Buzzer blog

[6] VPSN has also blogged on this lecture. Geoff meggs has also written on the topic.

Bridge Traffic

For purpose of illustration, below is a map overlaid with the traffic volume on the main bridges of the Vancouver area.

Traffic on the Main bridges of the greater Vancouver area (click on the map for more detail)

Some comments on it:

Traffic

• Traffic volume distribution is hourly, for weekday, and estimated when data is not available [3]
• truck traffic on Knight bridge is estimated at 15% of the overall traffic
• Red line indicate the capacity of the bridge, assuming a 1400 vehicle/hr capacity per lane
• For bridge over the Fraser, A suggested Congestion pricing toll [5] has been added in yellow

below is the tabulaton of weekday daily traffic, and source for the considered bridge

Bridge	Juridiction	Lanes	Traffic
Arthur Laing Bridge	YVR	4	84,000 [2]
Oak Bridge	Province	4	80,700 [1][4]
Knight Bridge	Translink	4	99,500 [2]
QueensBorough Bridge	Province	4	84,000 [2]
George Massey Tunnel	Province	4	89,500 [1]
Alex Fraser Bridge	Province	6	117,500 [1]
Pattullo Bridge	Translink	4	74,500 [2]
Port Mann Bridge	Province	5	116,000 [1]
Iron Workers Bridge	Province	6	127,400 [1]
Lions gate Bridge	Province	3	63,000 [1]

Comments on the Congestion pricing data

They come from the thesis of Peter Wightman [5], which is the most complete work I have uncovered on the topic applied on the Vancouver area, but still limited on the Fraser crossing bridges.

• toll is applied once the traffic volume exceed the road capacity
• Price elasticity demand is assumed at -0.2 peak hours, and -0.25 off peak, That is pricing evaluation has been done in 2006, assuming the transit option of the time, i.e. no Canada line and no transit over Port Mann bridge. Another study suggests a price elasticity demand closer to 0.35, in case of improved transit (i.e. Congestion regulation could be achieved with significant lower toll that those envisioned by [5], and revenue of congestion pricing too)

For information, below are the estimated revenue of congestion pricing, in the case of all bridge crossing the Fraser tolled (this assuming the 2006 situation, and a relatively low elasticity of -0.2 peak, and -0.25 off peak period) according to [5].

Bridge	daily revenue (South dir)	daily revenue (North dir)
George Massey Tunnel	89,600	64,400
Alex Fraser Bridge	126,000	67,200
Pattullo Bridge	35,000	21,000
Port Mann Bridge	271,600	90,300
Total (daily)	765,100
Total Annual	191,275,000

It is worth to note that congestion pricing could apply only when bridge reach capacity. At the exception of the Port Mann bridge West bound, that is an average of only 4 hours per bridge (or put in other way, crossing a bridge could be free 20hours per day),… but still generating close to 200 millions of annual revenue only on the bridge crossing the Fraser river.

it is also worth to notice that under a congestion pricing scheme as proposed by [5], the Port Mann bridge toll could have been lower than the one considered by the province (in green on the map above) most of the time…and the Pattullo bridge needs to be tolled less than 3hrs per day (per direction).

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[1] Number from BC MOT as of Sept 2010 (weekday average on the month

[2] Number from Bridging the Infrastructure Gap, Get Moving BC, Sept 2008. Data are mostly from 2006

[3] I got hourly distribution only for BC MOT bridge, hourly distribution is estimated for other bridge to provide an idea of level of congestion on them (and eventually pricing level/period). While data Provincial bidge are from 2010, and other bridge from 2006, it has been no noticeable increase in traffic in the interim, what is consistent with a longer trend already exhibited in a gateway program definition report of january 2006

[4] There is a discrepancy with number from the MovingBC report[2] eventually due to the fact, that the authors of this report overlooked the fact that the traffic counter is installed south of the Sea Island exit ramp on the Highway 99 south bound. That explains why there is a traffic increase on that bridge

[5] From Freeway to feeway: Congestion pricing policies for BC’s Fraser River crossing, Peter Wightman, Simon Fraser University, 2008

[6] Estimating Commuter Mode choice: A discrete choice Analysis impact of road pricing and parking charge, Washbrook, Haider and Jaccard, Transportation, 2006.

[7] Toll for new Port Mann Bridge will be $5.15 for casual users, Damian Inwood, The province, June 2010.

Bike in Style

In a recent talk at SFU to present their book, Carjacked, Catherine Lutz and Anne Lutz fernandez were mentioning as a myth the assertion:

“Cars make me an individual”.

Yes, people will drive a car they believe will enhance their image, but that statement is true for every visible action we accomplish as a customer: that is the real reason why we are not driving the cheapest car around, but also wear more or less expensive clothes which we believe express our personality as well, and I am not sure that is because we are brainwashed by ads.

The question arise:

how to attract those “image conscious” people to cycling?

could it be with the ad campaign recently ran in Vancouver?

An ad for the bike month campaign in Vancouver, June 2010: Is it really the cyclist image you would like to be associated with?

Naturally, with such negative ads campaigns, basically the only ones ran on cycling, carmaker doesn’t need to put lot of effort to convey the message that “car are safe” and associate the autombile with a more positive image

The counter-productivity of such campaigns, is well recognized by some studies [4], recommending instead to promote cycling by putting a positive spin on it and foremost on the bike users themselves.

That could be the aim of the chic cyclists movement which seems to address the concerns of the image conscious people, by letting them know: you don’t need to wear a sci-fi helmet and lycra outfit, to bike: Your every day dress are right enough…and, stylish and fashion they can be.

The movement started with Copenhagen Cycle chic initiated by Mikael Colville-Andersen, which got an echo on the blog of the VancouverSun columnist, Tod Douglas [2], seems to have found an audience. Toronto, is in the wheel, with Toronto Bike Chic or 416cyclestyle, while Paris, city where its finest hotels provide complimentary bikes [5], has eventually been credited by nothing else than a full book on the topic [3].

A Chic torontonian cyclist (left) (credit photo [1]).The former L.A. prosecutor Garcetti, reconverted as a Photograph, has become the main advocate of Parisan cycling chic (right) (credit photo [3])

New York City’s efforts to promote cycling, has even been complimented by luxury brand LVMH which has involved students at the Fashion Institute of Technology in a bike in style challenge [6]. While that could be a departure of the cycle chic movement manifesto, it is also a departure of the biking seen only for the wanna-be athlete and other treehugger people.

In Vancouver BC, where cycling is considered as a dangerous activity, biking in style can be more challenging due to the local anti-cycle chic law, but the cycling chic movement got some traction here too, with VancouverCycleChic, albeit, by eventually taking a civil disobedience stand, as have done the oppressed cyclists of Melbourne

Vancouver Mayor, Gregor Robertson, is biking a cycle apparently without bell and with footstrapped pedal: eventually an unsafe proposition in a urban environment: could it be the reason why this BC cyclist needs an helmet?

All that movement in fact is not without reminding us what has made the success of the bicycle a century ago:

Not unlike a century ago, the “cycle chic” movement doesn’t promote cycling by triggering an ecologic sensitive cord, neither explain it make financially sense or it is good for you health, but because it is good for your image: elegance, seduction and desire elements become core of the message…it is something the car advertiser already knews.

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[1] http://www.flickr.com/photos/mackenziechan/,

[2] Danish Women on bikes, Todd Douglas, Feb 2, 2010.

[3] Paris, Women and bicycles, Gil Garcetti, Balcony Press, 2010. you can see some picture at the author’s website

[4] Vers une pratique quotidienne du velo en ville, ADEME, July 2004

[5] it is noticably the case of the Plaza Athénée. While, numerous hotel in Vancouver offer similar service like the Fairmont hotel, some other like the Wedgwood hotel seems to see biking only as an exercise, to practice preferably in the comfort of their fitness room, and have consequently a different take on cycling.

[6] Luxury Leader LVMH to Be a Main Sponsor of NYC’s 2009 Summer Streets, Businesswire, June 29, 2009

Dumpster

A more or less typical Vancouver Down Town Alley, not really engaging, isn'it? credit photo (1)

Michael Geller has collected interesting idea from Spain, on its blog, including one he thinks could improve the look of our dumpsters:

Dumpster in Barcelona, Spain. credit Photo (2)

But may be we can go one step beyond, and remove them altogether from sight by putting them underground to have something looking more like this:

Dumpster are not nice, smelly and take room. put them underground

Buried dumpster become a common fixture in Europe, and often, they are mounted on a lifting platform looking like it when opened:

the 'buried' dumpster are in fact mounted on a lifting platform making them readily accesible for garbage collection

You can check [4] to see how it works. That said, some other “buried” dumpster systems exist [5], and could be certainly worth to be explored, not only for collection of household and commercial waste, but also to replace too often overflowing bins on Granville Mall and elsewhere, and that could allow to fully exploit the potential of our alleys like Seattle has did for some of them:

Nord alley, Seattle. credit photo (3)

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[1]http://www.unurth.com

[2]Michael Geller

[3]MyUrbanist

[4] this youtube video illustrates how can wok the lift system

[5] another system, not relying anymore on rolling dumpster, can be view in demonstration on this youtube video.

GEB or how translink blames the lack of sprawl

The explanation by Translink of the more than 30% shortfall in traffic on the Golden Ears Bridge (GEB) turns to the pathetic farce [6][7].

Blame the economic downturn

The economic downturn is a usual scape goat for lot of things, including the miserable failing to secure private financing for the Port Mann bridge. A reality check is needed:

The Vehicle mile traveled has decreased by less than 1% in the heavily affected US since their top. source (11)

As indicated by the graph above, Vehicle miles traveled (VMT) has decreased by less than 1% in the heavily affected US economy since their top. More important, one should note the halt of the progression in the VMT dates back to 2004-2005. In fact the steep increase in oil price, consequence of global growth has affected the travel pattern before the economic down turn.

One could argue that things could be different on toll roads and in Canada; but an examination of the Toronto’s toll road 407ETR recent results [5] confirms that the economic downturn has got little effect on the traffic, which didn’t prevent the 407ETR revenue to constantly grow up to now (2.5% in 2009).

traffic on the Toronto ETR has decreased only marginally. source (5)

One could argue that the truck traffic could be more affected by the economic downturn. That is fair, but from its own study [3] , Translink was not expecting more than 5% of truck traffic (what say a lot on the argument justifying such investment on the need to move goods).

Blame the lack of sprawl and transit usage

It could be a farce, but unafraid of the ridicule, it is what said the Translink spokesman, Ken Hardie, to the VancouverSun and other media outlet [6] [7] . That is clearly a shame for an agency supposed to be committed to creating a transportation system for a sustainable region and that is probably the bigger problem raised by this incestuous affair of Translink with the roads:

Translink is saddled with a money loosing investment, and in deep conflict of interest:

• transit development in the area can’t do any good to the GEB financial sheet.

One should note that this pathetic deviation to the shaping of a “sustainable region” was already read in the translink GEB frequentation forecast study happily considering a linear infinite progression of car ownership and traffic in the region [3] , hitherto giving up on any transportation mode shift in the area.

Obviously those are not the real reasons, for the failure of the GEB to meet its traffic and revenue forecast. The real reason is the structure of the project itself:

The Pork Barrel theory

THE GEB case is not isolated, and example like the Clem7 in Brisbane, or the A14 [10] in Paris show that there is worse elsewhere. In fact a Standard&Poor study has shown that most of similar projects see their actual traffic as only 76% of the predicted one [1]. Lame excuses as worded by Translink has been advanced for such poor return on investment [4]… But a study sponsored by the European Investment Bank, has tried to understand why most of the P3 contracts are awarded on very optimistic forecast bias [2]. The conclusion – notice we don’t refer to the first populist rant found in your favorite tabloid- is that those P3 are often crafted to be a Pork barrel where lot of actors have a vested interest while they get exposed to little if any liabilities.

The GEB P3 doesn’t make exception

The Private sector obviously hasn’t put a penny on the phony forecast: It is no accident that Translink supports all the risks tied to the revenue side. In the meantimes the initial private parties have constituted some more or less shady adhoc companies to manage the GEB, companies with which they could easily severe ties whether liabilities could become a concern.

GEB revenue forecast (in 2003$). In yellow is the induced traffic by the bridge, in red is the traffic generated by sprawl. source Steer Davis for Translink (3)

A “phony” forecast can be achieved by means of “strategic error” [2]. In the GEB example, we have already noticed the, not only undesirable from a sustainability viewpoint, but also unrealistic linear and infinite, growth in car ownership and vehicular traffic. More, the GEB forecast [3] takes account all the contributive investment inducing more traffic, like road widening, but carefully ignores the competitive ones, especially the then already under planned twinning of the Port Mann bridge [8]

Ironically, the Port Mann bridge twinning and all the Gateway projects in Lower Mainland rational are grounded on the same flawed studies, sometimes provided by the same consultant [9], which have proved widly inaccurate…That doesn’t prevent the province to proceed full steam ahead…

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[1]Traffic Forecasting Risk Study Update 2005, Robert Bain and Lidia Polakovic, October 2005

[2]Why traffic forecasts in PPP contracts are often overestimated?, EIB University Research Sponsorship Programme, December 2007

[3] New Fraser River Crossing: Traffic and Revenue Forecasts, Steer Davies Gleave for GVTA, May 2004

[4] Error and optimism bias in toll road traffic forecasts Transportation, Netherlands, February 2009

[5] On The Right Track: Continuous Improvement In P3 Delivery, By ETR407 presented at BMO Capital Markets Infrastructure & Utilities Conference, Feb 18, 2010.

[6] noticeably it is said that “TransLink blames the poor economy, worse-than-expected development around the bridge and a jump in transit ridership on the buses and the West Coast express” by NEWS1130, June 3rd, 2010.

[7] TransLink considers reducing Golden Ears tolls, Kelly Sinoski, VancouverSun, June 3rd, 2010

[8] Opening up
B.C.., MOT, 2003

[9] Abstract of Studies – Gateway Program Traffic and Tolling Analysis, MOT, May 2006

[10] Autoroute A 14 Bilan LOTI, CGPC, November 2005 states an observed 2004 traffic at 61% of the forecast, on the A14 toll freeway opened in 1996

[11] Number of the US Federal Highway administration as of March 2010

turnstile: the French take

[edited on May 30th 2010]

This post is written in the context of the decision to move from the current honor system to the barrier controlled access rail transit system in Vancouver. The capital cost involved by the move is estimated at $100 millions [3]. the cost of fare evasion on the Vancouver rail system is estimated at $3.5 millions per year [4].

Fare evasion

At the beginning the Paris subway had human fare control at its gates. In a move to save on fare control operating cost, the Parisian transit agency, had started to implement turnstile, pretty much in the style seen on the Toronto TTC or the Vancouver seabus…
But Quickly, it appeared that the lack of human control once in the subway system was a pretty good incentive to dodge the turnstiles.

The full display of fare evasion as well as turnstile dodging technique associated with perceived impunity of such behavior, has encouraged wide spreading of similar conducts in the Paris subway, then adopted by people of all conditions as illustrated below

.

A French countryman, Jacques Chirac, dodging a turnstile in the Paris subway on Dec 5, 1980, station Auber. He was then Mayor of Paris, he will become head of State (credit photo bnf)

That has lead the French transit agency, the ratp to adopt more elaborate faregate, now featuring full door.

• either the door stay open long enough, and several people (following close enough) can pass the gate with a single fare.
• or the door close very quickly, and you can’t cross the gate with any luggage, or stroller.

In despite of tremendous investment in fare gating, fare evasion is estimated at 10% in the Parisian subway what is in fact comparable to the access free subway in Berlin [7] and way much more than the 5% measured in Vancouver [4] or 6% on the access free subway of Los Angeles in 2007 [8]

in any case, the turnstiles are an impediment slowing down the flow of transit riders, and the good thing introduced by smart-cards, is that it allow to mitigate this point.

One will note that if fare evasion was the justification for a fare gating, subsidy could be then not necessary. In reality fare evasion on Vancouver transit system is as low as 2.5% system wide (5% on the Skytrain, what amount to $3.5 millions revenue lost a year, which could be only partially recovered by turnstiles) [4], that is nowhere near to able to justify an $100 million investment [3]. In comparison of other systems [7][9][10], there is a generally good level of compliance in Vancouver, observation that the casual observer could have confirmed during the Olympic games, by watching the sometime hour long line-up at the fare vending machine .

Security

It has been a strange and unsubstantiated claim done by the British Columbia government that the fare gates could increase the security on the skytrain [2].
The opposite could be more true: In fact, the diversion of resource going to the maintenance and amortization of the fare gates, instead of human staffing are of nature to make the system less safe.
The creativity of the fare gate dodgers and other smugglers being boundless, it appears that nothing is able to replace human staffing as the picture below illustrates and could also apply to Canada [6]

.

Police, at Paris Gare du Nord, in April 2007, makes sure everyone is paying his fare!

Nevertheless, the unsubstantiated BC government claim will suffice to justify to allocate $70 millions of subsidy by senior government toward a fare gating system on the Vancouver rail network [3]

The smart card

Another strange association has been done in BC between the turnstile and the smart card. Both can be put in place separably, as it is done on numerous transit network.

smartcard access to the subway of Rennes, France, is done without turnstile. Nevertheless, notice how the smart card readers are placed in prominent position on the farepaid zone line (credit photo wikipedia commons)

The distance based pricing

That seems the only reason a network transit the size of the Vancouver one, could wish to adopt turnstiles control. Controlling entry and exit of the network effectively allows the transit operator to charge by the distance, as done in some rail network, more noticeably on the Hong Kong MTR [5]

Still, in this case, one will find curious the government interference in a matter which should be a priori leads by economic consideration.

Even so: the logic would like that the smart card come first, since it can work currently in the 3 zones model, which is common to numerous network, like the Paris one, and turnstiles in a second phase. Curiously, according to the VancouverSun [1], it is the reverse we gonna see, and suffer all the inconvenience of the faregate, including compromised ease of access to the transit system for people with special needs; from the traveler with luggage, to the wheelchairs, without the advantage of the smartcard.

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[1] Olympic commuters sticking with public transit, Vancouver Sun, May 25, 2010

[2] Free rides approach end of the line on SkyTrain, CBC, November 09, 2007.

[3] Canada, BC and TransLink Invest in Transit Security Improvements, press release from Canda government, April 09, 2009

[4] Fare evasion Internal Audit, by PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Translink, September 2007

[5] Notice that such distance based pricing model can a priori apply only to the rail network, and not the bus one. Nevertheless, the smart card can allow implementation of a bus route based pricing like on the model of Hong Kong

[6] Montreal police quell subway brawl, Globe and Mail, December 27, 2009.

[7] TTC fare collection study, TTC, October 2000.

[8] Metro Rail Gating Study, Metro Los Angeles, November 15, 2007

[9] Toronto TTC has a fare evasion of as low as 0.7% on its subway [7], but one should note that all the turnstiles lines are constantly monitored by human staff, via strategic location of ticket office at the stations, as well as additional staffing at rush hours. Non staffed entrance, are equipped of full rotating door, unable to accommodate people with special need (wheelchair, stroller,…). In conclusion, it could be hard to conclude that the low fare evasion number is achieved by turnstiles alone. This observation can be confirmed by the number from the New York subway able to reduce from 3.5% to 0.5% the level of fare evasion through policy measures [7].

[10] The level of fare evasion is estimated at 5% in Montreal, where the subway is accessed throug fare gate, as estimated by the Montreal Transit Agency (stm communiqué, April 21th, 2008 )

Translink 2009 Annual report reviewed

The 209 annual report released at the Translink‘s AGM contains some interesting statements

The Skytrain

It is claimed that the “Expo and Millennium SkyTrain Lines are the most efficient, lowest-cost operations in North America” with a supporting comparison with some selected American LRT. One will wonder why, the figure doesn’t include the Calgary LRT?

GHG

An interesting figure comparing the GHG emission per mode seems to be a direct answer to prof. Patrick Condon claims stated in several of its publications [4]. Unfortunatly, Translink number doesn’t seems to be produced with much more rigor than the professor Patrick Condon’s one.

But the more interesting and worrisome numbers will require further reading of the report to get extracted:

Operating efficiency

year	Number of revenue passengers in millions	Operating Cost in $Millions	Fare Revenue in $Millions	Operating cost recovery
2005	160	516	284	56.4%
2006	165	572	300	53.8%
2007	172	621	316	52.5%
2008	179	688	347	52%
2009	188	735	355	49.8%

Like eventually previously mentioned by the Translink commission, the growth strategy pursued by Translink appears non sustainable, in the sense that the ridership increase doesn’t translate in farebox recovery improvement. Worse, it degrades it.

To be sure Translink is not the only agency in this case, as we have seen in the Zurich model, but eventually the region could not spare a debate on the expected level of funding of transit operation (and subsidiary sources).

the Service rationalization initiative

In the immediate, the answer seems to be the service rationalization initiative. Some Observers seems to dismiss it [3] but it is probably a welcome move if done to ensure the sustainability of the ridership growth. Again, the Zurich model demonstrates that service, and consequently ridership, can be greatly improved by other means that piling out hours of transit service. here are some ideas we can provide:

Bus Stops consolidation

Consolidate bus stop! Too often, bus stops are not very far apart. The picture below is the one along the 410 route between Aberdeen Station and Garden city road:

• East bound, the bus will stop every 200m on average!
• west bound, at Garden city intersection, 2 stops are spaced by no more than 50m, with no reasonable explanation for it

Those stops could be not such a draw on operation in off peak, but it will still involve a slowdown of the bus at stop without patron. At peak hour, it slowdown considerably the bus for marginal convenience (if any).

The consolidation of bus stops could not save too much time on one run, but in the case of the 410 route example, there is ~100 runs per direction a day, so the cumulative time can be not negligible.
In addition of time, the suppression of stops can certainly save other operational cost (less braking, acceleration,…), and can make the bus ride smoother.

Other strategy, not necessarily very costly to implement, like traffic signal preemption, can also help not only to save time, but to improve the bus operation efficiency and ride smoothness

Demand management

“peak hour” determine the number of buses which need to be owned and maintained, and so can be expensive to serve, as it can be illustrated by the graph below ilustrating the translink’s bus service surge during peak hours[1]

number of Translink's bus in service according to time of a regular day

If Translink were coming with a fare structure favoring journey off peak hour, they could reduce this expensive peak pressure (hence reducing the number of bus to maintain and marginally operate…). An idea could be a discounted pass valid only after 9:30am (hence involving a return trip starting after 5:30pm for regular commute)…[2]

Bus schedules

provide a “regular timetable” for low frequency route: this is almost the case for route like the 351, but there is lot of room for improvment on the 601.
On such route the schedule should be so simple that people could not need to have a timetable to know at what time their bus is schedule.

More elaborated strategies like “code sharing” should be investigated to provide high visibility of level of service.

Those last suggestions will note necessarily decrease the operating costs but are prone to attract more rider at no extra operational cost, and it is what Translink should explore for the time being, this to break out this vicious circle where, the “more people ride the system, the more subsidy it needs”

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[1] the graph has been built by a contributor of the skyscraperpage forum

[2] The reader will find further discussion on the topic at the human transit blog

[3] TransLink on ‘life support’, Franck Luba, The province, May 12th. See also Geoff Meggs take on it.

[4] Seven Rules for Sustainable Communities, Patrick Condon, 2010 . The chapter 2 available here is built on a previous publication: A Cost Comparison of Transportation Modes, Patrick Condon and Kari Dow, Foundational research Bulletin, November 2009.